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The Bail Reform Act of 1984 and Witness
Coercion
INTRODUCTION
The Bail Reform Act of 19841 was enacted by Congress to
counter "the alarming problem of crimes committed by persons on
release" 2 from custody prior to trial. The 1984 Act provided the
courts with authority to detain those accused of certain crimes
before trial regardless of their ability or inability to provide bail.
This was based on the theory that "there is a small but identifi-
able group of particularly dangerous defendants as to whom
neither the imposition of stringent release conditions nor the pros-
pect of revocation of release can reasonably assure the safety of
the community or other persons."'
Under the 1984 Bail Reform Act, a defendant may be detained
before trial in three distinct sets of circumstances. Pretrial deten-
tion may be ordered if the defendant presents a serious flight risk,4
a serious risk concerning obstruction of justice,5 or a danger to the
safety of any person or the community.6 In the past, courts have
been empowered to employ pretrial detention for risk of flight or
obstruction of justice through statutory authority or case law.
The 1984 Act's most important modification to the bail system
concerns detention based on the defendant's dangerousness.'
To effect the pretrial detention of a defendant based on danger
to other persons or the community, the prosecution must present
the court with a motion for detention.9 The defendant is then
1. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1984), (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 3141-3150 (Supp. 1986)).
2. S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 3182, 3185.
3. Id. at 3189.
4. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(2)(A) (1984).
5. Id. § 3142(f)(2)(B) (1984).
6. Id. § 3142(e) provides the judicial officer with the power to detain defendants
prior to trial on the basis of danger to any other person or the community after a detention
hearing is held pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3142(0.
7. See, e.g., Carbo v. U.S., Gilbert v. U.S. and the Judiciary Act of 1789. See also
infra notes 23-44 and accompanying text.
8. As discussed infra, courts have long had the authority to detain defendants before
trial based on risk of flight or obstruction of justice.
9. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(0(1) states that only the government may make a motion for
pretrial detention based on a defendant's dangerousness, while either the government or the
judicial officer is allowed to make a motion for a defendant's pretrial detention based on
risk of flight or obstruction of justice under 18 U.S.C. § 3142(0(2).
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given a hearing in which the judicial officer must make three sepa-
rate findings of fact to order detention.10 First, there must be
probable cause that the person charged committed the offense.11
Second, there must be evidence that the accused's crime falls
under a specified category set forth in sections 3142(e) or (f) of
the Act. 12 Third, there must be a finding that there is no condition
or combination of conditions of release which will reasonably as-
sure the safety of other persons or the community. 3 If probable
cause is found that the defendant committed a crime listed in sec-
tions 3142(e) or (f), there is a rebuttable presumption that this
defendant poses a flight and/or safety risk.14 The burden then
10. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e) empowers the judicial officer to order pretrial detention only
after a hearing pursuant to the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 3142(0.
11. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 2, at 3201.
For good reason the bill does not incorporate, as a pre-condition of pretrial deten-
tion, a finding that there is substantial probability that the defendant committed
the offense for which he is charged . . . . While this "substantial probability"
requirement might give some additional measure of protection against the possibil-
ity of allowing pretrial detention of defendants who are ultimately acquitted, the
Committee is satisfied that the fact that judicial officer has to find probable cause
will assure the validity of the charges against the defendant, and that any addi-
tional assurance provided by a 'substantial probability' test is outweighed by the
practical problems in meeting this requirement at the stage at which the pretrial
hearing is held.
12. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f) details the crimes for which both the government or thejudicial officer may demand a bail hearing; while 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e) provides "rebuttable
presumptions" that apply to defendants whose crimes fit into three of the categories. The
first category consists of those who have been convicted of a federal offense described at 18
U.S.C. § 3142(f)(1), or a state or local offense that would have been an offense described
at subsection (f)(1) if circumstances giving rise to federal jurisdiction had existed. The
second category consists of those who are accused of an offense listed at § 3142(e)(1) that
was committed while on pretrial release for a federal, state, or local offense. The third
consists of those accused of a crime listed at § 3142(e)(1) if it was committed not more
than five years after being convicted or released from imprisonment for another offense
listed at § 3142(e)(1), whichever is later.
13. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e).
14. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 2, at 3202.
The first of these arises when it is determined that a person charged with a seri-
ously dangerous offense has in the past been convicted of committing another seri-
ous crime while on pretrial release. Such a history of pre-trial criminality is, ab-
sent mitigating information, a rational basis for concluding that a defendant poses
a significant threat to community safety and that he cannot be trusted to conform
to the requirements of the law while on release. Section 3142(e) provides, there-
fore, that in a case in which a defendant is charged with one of the serious of-
fenses described in § 3142(0(1) (a crime of violence, a crime punishable by death,
a crime for which the maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or more is
prescribed in the Controlled Substances Import and Export Act (21 U.S.C. § 951)
or Sec. I of the Act of Sept. 15, 1980 (21 U.S.C. § 955a)), a rebuttable presump-
tion arises that no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure
the safety of any other person and the community, if the judicial officer finds: (1)
that the defendant had been convicted of another offense described in subsection
(f)(1) (or a State or local offense that would have been such an offense if circum-
stances giving rise to federal jurisdiction had existed); (2) that this offense was
committed while the person was on pretrial release; and (3) that no more than five
2
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shifts to the defendant to prove that there are release conditions
sufficient to assure he will not engage in criminal activity or flee
prior to trial.15
The evidence presented by the prosecution may be in the form
of a proffer, and need not conform to the rules pertaining to ad-
missibility in a court of law.' What this means, realistically, is
years have elapsed since the date of conviction, or the defendant's release from
imprisonment, for the offense, whichever is later. The Committee believes that it is
appropriate in such circumstances that the burden shift to the defendant to estab-
lish a basis for concluding that there are conditions of release sufficient to assure
that he will not again engage in dangerous criminal activity pending his trial. The
term "crime of violence" is defined in § 3156, as amended by this title.
The second rebuttable presumption arises in cases in which the defendant is
charged with felonies punishable by ten years or more of imprisonment described
in 21 U.S.C. § 841, § 952(a), § 953(a), § 955, and § 959 which cover opiate
substances and offenses of the same gravity involving non-opiate controlled sub-
stances, or an offense under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) which covers the use of a firearm
to commit a felony. These are serious and dangerous Federal offenses. The drug
offenses involve either trafficking in opiates or narcotic drugs, or trafficking in
large amounts of other types of controlled substances. It is well known that drug
trafficking is carried on to an unusual degree by persons engaged in continuing
patterns of criminal activity. Persons charged with major drug felonies are often in
the business of importing or distributing dangerous drugs, and thus, because of the
nature of the criminal activity with which they are charged, they pose a significant
risk of pretrial recidivism. Furthermore, the Committee received testimony that
flight to avoid prosecution is particularly high among persons charged with major
drug offenses. Because of the extremely lucrative nature of drug trafficking, and
the fact that drug traffickers often have established substantial ties outside the
United States from whence most dapgerous drugs are imported into the country.
these persons have both the resources and foreign contacts to escape to other coun-
tries with relative ease in order to avoid prosecution for offenses punishable by
lengthy prison sentences. Even the prospect of forfeiture of bond in the hundreds
of thousands of dollars has proven to be ineffective in assuring the appearance of
major drug traffickers. In view of these factors, the Committee has provided in §
3142(e) that in a case in which there is probable cause to believe that the person
has committed a grave drug offense, a rebutable [sic] presumption arises that no
condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of
the person and the safety of the community. Similar obvious considerations based
upon the inherent dangers in committing a felony using a firearm support a rebut-
table presumption for detention. Id. at 3202-03.
15. Id. at 3202-03. "The Committee believes that it is appropriate in such circum-
stances that the burden shift to the defendant to establish a basis for concluding that there
are conditions of release sufficient to assure that he will not again engage in dangerous
criminal activity pending his trial." Id. at 3202.
16. Id. at 3205. The committee stated:
The procedural requirements for the pretrial detention hearing set forth in section
3142(f) are based on those of the District of Columbia statute which were held to
meet constitutional due process requirements in United States v. Edwards, 430
A.2d 1321 (1981). The person has a right to counsel, and to the appointment of
counsel if he is financially unable to secure adequate representation. He is to be
afforded an opportunity to testify, to present witnesses on his own behalf, to cross-
examine witnesses who appear at the hearing, and to present information by prof-
fer or otherwise. As is currently provided with respect to information offered in
bail determinations, the presentation and consideration of information at a deten-
tion hearing need not conform to the rules of evidence applicable in criminal trials.
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that an investigator may testify as to what witnesses for the prose-
cution have told him. Because the defendant has no right to sub-
poena witnesses to the hearing, there is no way to force his accus-
ers to be cross-examined prior to his detention.17 This detention
prior to trial may continue indefinitely due to the excludable time
delay loophole within the Speedy Trial Act, which governs the
maximum length of pretrial detention."'
Over a bitter dissent, the U.S. Supreme Court decided six to
three that the Bail Reform Act was facially constitutional in the
case of United States v. Salerno.9 The Salerno decision divided
the Court into two factions diametrically opposed in both philoso-
phy and opinion.
The majority, led by Chief Justice Rehnquist, preferred to take
a utilitarian view of individual rights, and adhered to the position
that an entirely reasonable solution to pretrial crime is to sacrifice
the individual's freedom for the greater safety of society. Writing
for the majority, Rehnquist stated: "We do not minimize the im-
portance and fundamental nature of this right [to pretrial bail].
But, as our cases hold, this right may, in circumstances where the
government's interest is sufficiently weighty, be subordinated to
Pending the completion of the hearing, the defendant may be detained.
Id.
17. United States v. Edwards, 430 A.2d 1321, 1334 (1981).
The legislative history of the statute confirms Congress' intent that the informa-
tion upon which the judicial officer makes his finding need not be sworn testimony,
and that the hearing is not designed to afford defendants a discovery device. Thus,
in providing that the finding of substantial probability is to be based on informa-
tion presented "by proffer or otherwise," the House Report anticipates "that, as is
the present practice under the Bail Reform Act, . . . the use of sworn testimony
will be the exception and not the rule .... [B]ail hearings under the Bail Reform
Act, which frequently result in detention of the accused, proceed primarily by way
of proffers. They are not formal trials requiring strict adherence to technical rules
of evidence. If the court is dissatisfied with the nature of the proffer, it can al-
ways, within its discretion, insist on direct testimony. But the discretion should be
left to the court without imposing on it the burden of limiting admissibility to
what it would permit a jury to hear. [H.R. REP. No. 91-907, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.
182, 184 (1970).]" Accordingly, hearsay evidence may be presented, although the
court may require direct testimony if dissatisfied with a proffer. (emphasis added).
Id.
18. See infra notes 110-13 and accompanying text for a discussion of this loophole.
The dissenting opinion in United States v. Accettura, 783 F.2d 382, 396 (3d Cir. 1986)
recognized the problems caused by this loophole, stating:
Its requirement of trial [The Speedy Trial Act of 1974] within 90 days for persons
who have been detained . . . has turned out to be largely illusory, in large part
because the provision covering detainees also incorporates the periods of excluda-
ble time enumerated in section 3161(h) in computing the 90 day time limitation.
As a result, detention can continue while all 18 different circumstances enumer-
ated in 3161(h) give rise to excludable delay.
Id. (Sloviter J., dissenting).
19. 107 S. Ct. 1095 (1986).
4
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the greater needs of society.""0
This was in stark contrast to the scathing dissent written by
Justice Marshall, who stated:
Throughout the world today, there are men, women and chil-
dren interned indefinitely, awaiting trials which may never come
or which may be a mockery of the word, because their govern-
ments believe them to be "dangerous". . . . Today a majority of
the Court applies itself to an ominous exercise in demolition.
Theirs is truly a decision which will go forth without authority,
and come back without respect.21
The Bail Reform Act of 1984 marks the culmination of efforts
throughout American history to achieve a proper balance between
several conflicting doctrines which are ingrained in the Anglo-
American system of justice. The presumption of innocence, and
protection of individual rights from the tyranny of the majority
are both strong arguments for the unrestricted provision of bail to
persons accused in American courts. Competing with this view is
the utilitarian argument of protection to the community at the ex-
pense of individual freedoms.
This Comment will demonstrate the method by which the Bail
Reform Act of 1984 can be used to coerce testimony from those
held under its provisions. Section One will explain the history of
bail in the United States, from the Judiciary Act of 1789, to the
current Bail Reform Act. Second, this Comment will analyze the
Salerno decision which held that the 1984 Bail Reform Act is
facially constitutional. Finally, this Comment will demonstrate
how the 1984 Act can be abused to obtain testimony in violation
of due process rights, and it will provide suggestions to make the
1984 Act a closer balance between the competing doctrines which
encouraged the legislation's enactment into law.
I. HISTORY OF BAIL
Bail has traditionally (in the Anglo-American system of justice)
been used for the primary purpose of assuring a defendant's pres-
ence at trial. The Judiciary Act of 1789 stated that:
[U]pon all arrests in criminal cases, bail shall be admitted, ex-
cept where the punishment may be death, in which cases it shall
not be admitted but by the supreme or a circuit court, or by ajustice of the Supreme Court, or a judge of a district court, who
shall exercise their discretion therein, regarding the nature and
circumstances of the offense, and of the evidences and usages of
law. 2
20. Id. at 2103.
21. Id. at 2112 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
22. Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 91 § 33 (1789).
1988]
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The rationale that bail's purpose is to assure a defendant's pres-
ence at trial was upheld in the 1951 Supreme Court case of Stack
v. Boyle.23 In Stack, the Supreme Court declared that each de-
fendant in a criminal case is entitled to an individualized bail
hearing, in which bail must be "based upon standards relevant to
the purpose of assuring the presence of the defendant."24
The Stack Court relied on United States v. Motlow,25 where it
was held that bail set at a figure higher than an amount reasona-
bly calculated to fulfill the purpose of assuring the accused's pres-
ence at trial was "excessive under the eighth amendment. 26 Chief
Justice Vinson of the Supreme Court wrote an eloquent opinion
for the majority in Stack, which provided for the provision of bail
in all noncapital offenses. He stated that:
From the passage of the Judiciary Act of 1789, to the present
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 46(a)(1), federal
law has unequivocally provided that a person arrested for a non-
capital offense shall be admitted to bail. This traditional right to
freedom before conviction permits the unhampered preparation
of a defense, and serves to prevent the infliction of punishment
before conviction. Unless this right to bail before trial is pre-
served, the presumption of innocence, secured only after centu-
ries of struggle, would lose its meaning.27
Justices Jackson and Frankfurter joined in a concurring opin-
28ion. 8 Justice Jackson, like Chief Justice Vinson, was vehemently
opposed to the denial of reasonable bail in noncapital cases:
The practice of admission to bail, as it has evolved in Anglo-
American law, is not a device for keeping persons in jail upon
mere accusations until it is found convenient to give them a
trial. On the contrary, the spirit of the procedure is to enable
them to stay out of jail until a trial has found them guilty.
Without this conditional privilege, even those wrongly accused
are punished by a period of imprisonment while awaiting trial
and are handicapped in consulting counsel, searching for evi-
dence, and preparing a defense.29
The rationale that bail should be set only in an amount neces-
23. 342 U.S. 1 (1951).
24. Id. at 5.
25. 10 F.2d 657 (1926).
26. Id. at 659. Justice Butler of the Supreme Court, then sitting as Circuit Judge in
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, stated for the majority:
The Eighth Amendment provides that "excessive bail shall not be required." This
implies, and therefore safeguards, the right to give bail at least before trial. The
purpose is to prevent the practical denial of bail by fixing the amount so unreason-
ably high that it cannot be given. The provision forbidding excessive bail would be
futile if magistrates were left free to deny bail.
27. Stack, 342 U.S. at 4.
28. Id. at 7 (Jackson, J., concurring).
29. Id. at 7-8 (Jackson, J., concurring).
[Vol. 25
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sary to assure a defendant's presence at trial was statutorily codi-
fied by Congress in the Bail Reform Act of 1966.0 The Bail Re-
form Act of 1966 was drafted in response to the injustice of the
requirement of a monetary bond before the release of indigent de-
fendants. 1 The legislative history of the Bail Reform Act of 1966
referred to the report of the Attorney General's Committee on
Poverty and the Administration of Criminal Justice Procedure in
supporting the need for the legislation, and concluded:
The bail system administered in the Federal Courts, relying pri-
marily on financial inducements to secure the presence of the
accused at the trial, results in serious problems for defendants of
limited means, imperils the effective operation of the adversary
system, and may even fail to provide the most effective deter-
rence of non-appearance by accused persons.32
The Bail Reform Act of 1966 changed the federal bail code by
providing for a rebuttable presumption that defendants should be
released on their own recognizance. 33 Furthermore, section 3 of
the Act provided alternate release conditions for those whose re-
lease on recognizance would "not reasonably assure the appear-
ance of the person as required." '34 In applying alternate release
conditions, judges were required to look at the nature and circum-
stances of the offense; the weight of the evidence against the ac-
cused; the accused's family ties, employment, and financial re-
sources; the accused's character and mental condition; the length
of his residence in the community; his record of convictions; and
his record of court appearance or flight at court appearances.a5
After carefully weighing this evidence, the judge could impose on
the defendant any combination of the following five conditions
which were deemed necessary to assure the defendant's appear-
ance at trial:
1. place the accused in the custody of a designated person or
organization agreeing to supervise him;
2. place restrictions on travel, association or place of abode of
the person during the period of release;
3. require the execution of an appearance bond in a specified
amount and the deposit in the registry of the court, in cash or
30. Bail Reform Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-465, § 2, 80 Stat. 214 (1966).
31. H.R. REP. No. 1541, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2293, 2299. The present system of monetary bail would be ade-
quate if all could afford it. The facts, however, are to the contrary. The rich person and the
professional criminal readily raise bail regardless of the amount. But it is the poor person,
lacking sufficient funds, who remains incarcerated prior to trial.
32. Id. at 2296.
33. Bail Reform Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-465, § 3, 80 Stat. 241 (1966).
34. Id. Section 3 consisted of seven new sections to be added to title 18, United
States Code. The language quoted here is from the amended § 3146.
35. Id.
19881
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other security as directed, of a sum not to exceed ten per centum
of the amount of the bond, such deposit to be returned upon the
performance of the conditions of release;
4. require the execution of a bail bond with sufficient solvent
sureties, or the deposit of cash in lieu thereof; or
5. impose any other condition deemed reasonably necessary to
assure appearance as required, including a condition that the
person return to custody after specified hours.36
Congress' clear intent in writing the Bail Reform Act of 1966
was to provide for bail in all possible instances where the risk of
flight could be outweighed by a combination of bail requirements.
This intent -was made clear in the legislative history of the Act,
which reads in part: "Studies have shown that failure to release
has other adverse effects upon the accused's preparation for trial,
retention of employment, relations with his family, his attitude to-
ward social justice, the outcome of the trial, and the severity of
the sentence. 37
The issue of pretrial release for dangerous individuals first be-
came known in the context of individuals who threatened to usurp
a court's internal processes through witness intimidation. In
United States v. Carbo, Justice Douglas held that "the risk of the
applicant using release on bail as the occasion to escape does not,
in my view, exhaust the conditions that may warrant denial of
bail."3" Further, the Carbo court held that "keeping a defendant
in custody during the trial" to render fruitless "any attempt to
interfere with witnesses or jurors may, in the extreme or unusual
case, justify denial of bail."3 9
This logic, that a court can revoke bail to protect its own inter-
nal processes, was again reiterated in the case of United States v.
Gilbert.40 The Gilbert court stated:
A trial court has the inherent power to revoke a defendant's bail
36. Id.
37. H.R. REP. No. 1541, supra note 31 at 2299. One of the major studies which the
legislators of the 1966 Bail Reform Act relied upon was The Manhattan Bail Project. The
Manhattan Bail Project evaluated each defendant using these factors as indicators of bai-
lability: defendant's employment, family ties, length of residence, references, current
charge, previous record, previous releases on bail, and connections to the community via
unemployment payments or hospitalization. Over the study's two-year period, it was found
that the vast majority of defendants would return to trial if a proper form of bail was
selected. For further information concerning The Manhattan Bail Project, see Ares,
Rankin & Strutz, The Manhattan Bail Project: An Interim Report on the Use of Pretrial
Parole, 38 N.Y.U. L. REv. 67 (1963).
38. United States v. Carbo, 369 U.S. 868 (1962).
39. Id. at 868. The Carbo Court quoted Estabrook v. Otis, 18 F.2d 689, 690 (8th
Cir. 1927): "Bail should not be granted where the offense of which the defendant has been
convicted is an atrocious one, and there is danger that if he is given his freedom he will
commit another of like character."
40. 425 F.2d 490 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
[Vol. 25
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during the trial if necessary to insure orderly trial processes ....
This is so even though it is recognized that a "defendant has an
absolute right to be enlarged on bail prior to conviction . .. ."
The necessities of judicial administration prevail, and the right
to bail is not literally absolute."1
The authors of the 1984 Bail Reform Act recognized the lack of
guidance provided under the 1966 Act for judges faced with dan-
gerous defendants who did not pose a flight risk. Judges faced
with this situation were often put in a position of releasing a dan-
gerous person who presented no flight risk, or to effectively deny
bail by imposing extraordinary amounts of bail based on an illu-
sory "risk of flight."' 2 The Attorney General's Task Force on Vio-
lent Crime realized this practice of detention via high monetary
bail was "widespread.' 43
Eager to correct the problem created by the pretrial detention
of indigent defendants on monetary bail, Congress pushed ahead
with the implementation of the Bail Reform Act of 1966. At the
same time, Congress recognized the dilemma the judiciary con-
fronted with dangerous individuals who did not pose a flight risk.
Unable to remedy the fault immediately, Congress left the ques-
tion of pretrial detention to a later date, stating that:
This legislation does not deal with the problem of the prevent-
ative detention of the accused because of the possibility that his
liberty might endanger the public .... It must be remembered
that under American criminal jurisprudence pretrial bail may
not be used as a device to protect society from the possible com-
mission of crimes by the accused .... A solution goes beyond
the scope of the present proposal and involves many difficult and
complex problems which require deep study and analysis.""
41. Id. at 491.
42. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 2, at 3187-88. As the committee explained in its
report:
The constraints of the [1966] Bail Reform Act fail to grant the courts the author-
ity to impose conditions of release geared toward assuring community safety, or
the authority to deny release to those defendants who pose an especially grave risk
to the safety of the community. If a court believes that a defendant poses such a
danger, it faces a dilemma-either it can release the defendant prior to trial, or it
can find a reason, such as a risk of flight, to detain the defendant (usually by
imposing high money bond). In the Committee's view, it is intolerable that the law
denies judges the tools to make honest and appropriate decisions regarding the
release of such defendants.
Id. at 3188.
43. ATT'Y GEN. TASK FORCE ON VIOLENT CRIME, FINAL REPORT 51 (Aug. 17,
1981).
44. H.R. REP. No. 1541, supra note 31, at 2296.
1988]
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II. BAIL REFORM ACT OF 1984
The Bail Reform Act of 1984 substantially revised the Bail Re-
form Act of 1966 in that it allowed the community's safety to be
considered in pretrial conditions of release.4" Further, the Act al-
lowed the pretrial detention of adult criminal defendants as to
whom no conditions of release would assure their appearance at
trial or the safety of the community or other persons.4 Congress
recognized the significant departure it was making from the 1966
Act as shown by the legislative history of the 1984 Bail Reform
Act. It stated in part that:
Many of the changes in the Bail Reform Act incorporated in
this bill reflect the Committee's determination that Federal bail
laws must address the alarming problem of crimes committed by
persons on release and must give the courts adequate authority
to make release decisions that give appropriate recognition to
the danger a person may pose to others if released. The adoption
of these changes marks a significant departure from the basic
philosophy of the Bail Reform Act, which is that the sole pur-
pose of bail laws must be to assure the appearance of the de-
fendant at judicial proceedings.47
However, the 1984 Bail Reform Act did not repeal the 1966 Act's
presumption of bailability, preferring the release of defendants
over detention.4 8 The congressional committee recognized that
pretrial detention was intended for a minority of defendants when
it stated:
There is a small but identifiable group of particularly dangerous
defendants as to whom neither the imposition of stringent re-
lease conditions nor the prospect of revocation of release can
reasonably assure the safety of the community or other persons.
It is with respect to this limited group of offenders that the
courts must be given the power to deny release pending trial.49
In the 1984 Act, Congress recognized that the 1966 Bail Re-
form Act had put judges in a terrible ethical dilemma in cases of
defendants who were not flight risks but were a danger to the
community. Under the Bail Reform Act of 1966, the judge could
only consider pretrial flight, and was thus placed in the position of
either retaining the defendant on high monetary bond as a risk of
flight, or releasing the defendant onto the unwary community. The
Department of Justice expressed a similar view in testimony:
45. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 2, at 3185.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 3185-86.
48. Id. at 3195. "it is anticipated that they [unsecured appearance bonds, condi-
tional release] will continue to be appropriate for the majority of Federal defendants." Id.
49. Id.
[Vol. '25
10
California Western Law Review, Vol. 25 [2015], No. 1, Art. 7
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol25/iss1/7
BAIL REFORM ACT OF 1984
Current law places our judges in a desperate dilemma when
faced with a clearly dangerous defendant seeking release. On
the one hand, courts may abide by the letter of the law and
order the defendant released subject only to conditions that will
assure his appearance at trial. On the other hand, the courts
may strain the law, and impose a high money bond ostensibly
for the purpose of assuring appearance, but actually to protect
the public. Clearly neither alternative is satisfactory. 50
In addressing this dilemma via the 1984 Bail Reform Act, Con-
gress sought to enable the courts to address the issue of pretrial
criminality "honestly and effectively." 51 The Bail Reform Act of
1984 was intended to "promote candor, fairness, and effectiveness
for society, the victims of crime-and the defendant as well." 52
The Bail Reform Act of 1984 allows for the pretrial detention
of defendants in three distinct categories of cases. The first of
these categories is where there is a risk of flight,5 3 the second is to
prevent obstruction of justice,5 and the third is where there is a
danger to the community or any other person. 55 The 1984 Act
also delineates who may make a motion for the defendant's pre-
trial detention on each of these bases, 5 and what offense must be
alleged to demand a hearing on the issue.57
If the defendant is accused of a crime listed in section
3142(f)(1), the government is entitled to demand a hearing to de-
termine if there is any condition or set of conditions to reasonably
assure the safety of any person or the community upon the ac-
cused's release. The crimes listed in section 3142(f)(1) include:
1. A crime of violence;58
2. An offense for which the maximum sentence is life imprison-
ment or death;59
3. An offense for which the maximum term of imprisonment of
ten years or more is prescribed by the Controlled Substances Act,
the Controlled Substances Import and Export Act, or section 1 of
the Act of September 15, 1980;60 or
4. Any felony committed after the person had been convicted of
50. Id. at 3193 (quoting Bail Reform Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Consti-
tution of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97 Cong., 1st Sess 177 (testimony of Jeffrey
Harris, Deputy Associate Attorney General)).
51. Id. at 3194.
52. Id.
53. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(2)(A).
54. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(2)(B).
55. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e).
56. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(1)-(f)(2).
57. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(0.
58. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(1)(A).
59. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(0(1)(B).
60. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(1)(C).
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two or more prior offenses described above, or two or more state
or local offenses that would have been offenses described above if
a circumstances giving rise to federal jurisdiction had existed. 1
If the government exercises its right to a hearing on the defend-
ant's dangerousness utilizing section 3142(0(1), it has the burden
of proving by "clear and convincing evidence" that no condition or
set of conditions will reasonably assure the community's safety.2
If, however, the government or the court believes that the de-
fendant poses a serious flight risk,63 or a serious threat via any
obstruction of justice,6 4 either may motion for the defendant's pre-
trial detention. 5 In either of these circumstances, there is no re-
quirement that the offense the defendant is charged with be of any
certain type. This motion also requires that the defendant be given
his right to a hearing under section 3142(0, where the govern-
ment must prove the defendant is a flight risk or a threat to the
judicial process."
Under section 3142(0, the defendant's hearing "shall be held
immediately upon the person's first appearance before the judicial
officer, unless that person, or the Government, seeks a continu-
ance."67 During this continuance, which may be no longer than
five days without good cause, the defendant remains detained. 8
After the hearing, the defendant has the right to testify, to present
witnesses on his own behalf, to cross-examine witnesses who ap-
pear, and to offer evidence by proffer or otherwise. 9 Should the
judicial officer find that no condition or set of conditions can rea-
sonably assure the safety of any person or of the community, he
may order the defendant's pretrial detention. °
In making such a determination, the judicial officer is guided by
the factors in section 3142(g). Included in these factors are:
1. The nature and circumstances of the offense charged, includ-
ing whether the offense is a crime of violence or involves a nar-
cotic or a drug;71
2. The weight of the evidence against the arrested person;72
61. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(1)(D).
62. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f).
63. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(2)(A).
64. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(2)(B).
65. 18 U.s.C. § 3142(0(2).
66. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(0.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e).
71. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)(1).
72. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)(2).
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3. The history and characteristics of the arrested person;7 3 and
4. The nature and seriousness of the danger posed by the ar-
rested person's release. 4
The 1984 Act also provides "rebuttable presumptions" as to the
defendants risk to community safety or probability of flight if the
crime he is charged with falls into certain categories. 71 The first
category inchides persons accused of a federal offense described in
section 3142(f)(1), or a state or local offense that would have been
an offense described in section 3142(f)(1) if circumstances giving
rise to federal jurisdiction had existed, who commit the offense
described above while on release pending trial. The offense must
have been committed not more than five years since the date of
conviction or release from imprisonment for another such offense,
whichever is later.76 In these cases the law provides a rebuttable
presumption that no condition or set of conditions will reasonably
assure the safety of any person or the community.77
In the second category of offenses, a rebuttable presumption
arises that no condition or set of conditions will reasonably assure
the appearance of the defendant as required or the safety of the
community. 78 This second set of cases includes serious drug of-
fenses, as well as felonies committed while in possession of a
firearm.79
Should the judicial officer determine that there is sufficient evi-
dence of a defendant's danger to the community, risk of flight or
likelihood of tampering with the court's internal processes via wit-
ness or juror intimidation, and orders detention pursuant to
U.S.C. section 3142(e), he must reduce his findings to a written
statement of the facts and reasons for pretrial detention.80 Upon
rendering this written opinion, the judicial officer may order the
defendant detained in the custody of the Attorney General; segre-
gated from persons awaiting or serving sentences, or being held in
custody pending appeal.8 l
73. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)(3).
74. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)(4).
75. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e).
76. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(2).
77. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(h).
81. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(i).
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III. United States v. Salerno: THE SUPREME COURT ANALYZES
THE FACIAL CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE BAIL REFORM ACT OF
1984
The facial constitutionality of the Bail Reform Act of 1984 was
first addressed by the United States Supreme Court in the 1987
case of United States v. Salerno.82 The Salerno majority, led by
Chief Justice Rehnquist, held that the 1984 Act was not suscepti-
ble to a facial constitutional challenge.8 3
The attack that Salerno attempted to mount against the 1984
Bail Reform Act was based on the premises that: (1) the Act vio-
lates the eighth amendment's proscription against excessive bail,
and (2) the Act violates the due process clause of the fifth amend-
ment. As the Salerno Court noted, "[a] facial challenge to a legis-
lative Act is, of course, the most difficult challenge to mount suc-
cessfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of
circumstances exists under which the Act is valid. ' 4 The Court
went on to say that, "[t]he fact that the Bail Reform Act might
operate unconstitutionally under some conceivable set of circum-
stances is insufficient to render it wholly invalid, since we have not
recognized an 'overbreadth' doctrine outside the limited context of
the First Amendment. '8 5
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, held that the
1984 Act did not violate the due process clause of the fifth amend-
ment by imposing impermissible punishment before trial. Relying
on the Court's decision in Bell v. Wolfish, 6 Chief Justice Rehn-
quist reasoned that pretrial detention under the Bail Reform Act
of 1984 constitutes a legitimate regulatory measure, and is there-
fore not "penal" in nature. As the Court held in Bell, the mere
fact that a person is detained does not inexorably lead to the con-
clusion that the government has imposed punishment.87
Reaching the conclusion that pretrial detention is not per se
82. 107 S. Ct. 2095 (1987).
83. Id. This reversed the Second Circuit Court of Appeals decision in United States
v. Salerno, 794 F.2d 64 (1986) in which the circuit court found "[s]ection 3142(e)'s au-
thorization of pretrial detention [on the grounds of future dangerousness] repugnant to the
concept of substantive due process, which we believe prohibits the total deprivation of lib-
erty simply as a means of preventing crimes." Id. at 71-72.
84. 107 S. Ct. at 2100. The Supreme Court stated, "we think respondents have
failed to shoulder their heavy burden to demonstrate that the Act is 'facially' unconstitu-
tional." Id.
85. Id. at 201.
86. Bell v. Walfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1978). The Court stated: "Not every disability
imposed during pretrial detention amounts to punishment in the constitutional sense, how-
ever. Once the Government has exercised its conceded authority to detain a person pending
trial, it obviously is entitled to employ devices that are calculated to effectuate that deten-
tion." Id. at 537.
87. Id.
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punishment, the Court sought to find authority that the actions
taken were legitimate regulatory actions on the part of the govern-
ment. The Court utilized the 1983 Supreme Court decision of
Schall v. Martin"8 for the proposition that "to determine whether
a restriction in liberty constitutes impermissible punishment or
permissible regulation, we first look to legislative intent." " In
looking at legislative intent, the Court used the guidance given in
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez,90 which states in part that
"[u]nless Congress expressly intended to impose punitive restric-
tions, the punitive/regulatory distinction turns on 'whether an al-
ternative purpose to which [the restriction] may be rationally con-
nected is assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in
relation to the alternative purpose assigned [to it.]' "9" The Ken-
nedy opinion, however, contained many more tests to be consid-
ered, stating that:
Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or re-
straint, whether it has historically been regarded as a punish-
ment, whether it comes into play only for a finding of scienter,
whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of pun-
ishment-retribution and deterrence, whether the behavior to
which it applies is already a crime, whether an alternative pur-
pose to which it may be rationally connected is assignable to it,
and whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative
purpose assigned are all relevant to the inquiry.9 2
Examining these alternative factors, it is clear that pretrial deten-
tion could easily become penal in nature if allowed to become ex-
cessive in relation to the legitimate regulatory goal it must
demonstrate.
The Court in Salerno found that the legislative intent of Con-
gress was clearly not to impose punishment before trial in viola-
tion of the fifth amendment due process clause," but rather to
offer "a possible solution to a pressing societal problem. 94 As
such, the Act must merely pass the test enumerated in Kennedy v.
Mendoza-Martinez, as to its rational connection to an alternative
purpose, and its excessiveness or lack of excessiveness in compari-
88. 467 U.S. 253, 269 (1984). (The Court upheld the post-arrest pretrial detention
of juveniles because it found juveniles to have a lesser interest in liberty than adults. Id. at
265.)
89. 107 S. Ct. at 201.
90. 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
91. 107 S. Ct. at 2101 (citing Schall, 467 U.S. at 269 (quoting Kennedy, 372 U.S.
at 168-69)).
92. Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 168-69.
93. Salerno, 107 S. Ct. at 2101. The Court referred to S. REP. No. 225, supra
note 2.
94. Salerno, 107 S. Ct. at 2101. The Court referred to S. REP. No. 225, supra
note 2.
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son to this goal. 5
Examining the alternative purpose to punishment that the Bail
Reform Act ostensibly was created to fulfill, and the purpose for
which it was enacted, the Court held that (1) the pretrial deten-
tion contemplated by the Bail Reform Act of 1984 is regulatory in
nature, and (2) this pretrial detention does not constitute punish-
ment before trial in violation of the fifth amendment's due process
clause. 6
Citing the 1984 Act's "extensive procedural safeguards," the
Supreme Court declared that the Act was not excessive in relation
to its regulatory goal.91 Among the factors cited which constitute
these safeguards are as follows:
1. The Act only operates on individuals who have been ar-
rested for a specific category of serious crimes,"8
2. The defendant is entitled to a prompt "full blown adver-
sarial hearing,"' 9
3. The maximum length is limited by the stringent time limi-
tations of the Speedy Trial Act,' 0 and
4. Detainees are housed in a separate facility to the extent
practicable, away from persons awaiting sentencing, serving
sentences, or being held in custody pending appeal.' 0'
After examining the procedural safeguards incorporated into the
1984 Act, the Supreme Court reasoned that it was not susceptible
to a facial attack on fifth amendment due process grounds. 102 In
reaching this conclusion, the Court stated, "[w]e think these ex-
tensive safeguards suffice to repel a facial challenge .... Given
the legitimate and compelling regulatory purpose of the Act and
the procedural protections it offers, we conclude that the Act is
not facially invalid under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment."' 03
95. Salerno, 107 S. Ct. at 2101.
96. Id.
97. Id. However, the Court went on to state that "[w]e intimate no view as to the
point at which detention in a particular case might become excessively prolonged, and
therefore punitive, in relation to Congress' regulatory goal." Id. at n.4.
98. Id. at 2101.
99. Id. at 2101, 2103. However, as noted previously, evidence at this adversarial
hearing may be based on hearsay which is clearly not cross-examinable.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 2100. The Court stated, "[w]e think respondents have failed to shoulder
their heavy burden to demonstrate that the Act is 'facially' unconstitutional." However,
this statement was footnoted as follows: "We intimate no view on the validity of any as-
pects of the Act that are not relevant to respondents case. Nor have respondents claimed
that the Act is unconstitutional because of the way it was applied to the particular facts of
their case." Id. at n.3.
103. Id. at 2104.
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IV. PREVIOUS DUE PROCESS ARGUMENTS MADE AGAINST THE
BAIL REFORM ACT OF 1984
Previous attacks on pretrial detention statutes have focused on
the amount of time spent between actual pretrial incarceration
and trial. In Schall v. Martin,'0 the U.S. Supreme Court upheld
a New York juvenile detention statute, citing its maximum length
provision of seventeen days for felony offenses and six days for
misdemeanors.10 5 As Justice Rehnquist stated in Schall, "[t]hese
time frames seem suited to the limited purpose of providing the
youth with a controlled environment.., pending the speedy dispo-
sition of the case."106
In drafting the Bail Reform Act of 1984, Congress refused to
include a mandatory time limit for pretrial detention. Recognizing
this, the Salerno Court imputed to Congress the desire to allow
the Speedy Trial Act' 07 to be an effective limitation to pretrial
detention.108 The Speedy Trial Act, however, was written long
before the 1984 Bail Reform Act, and did not address current is-
sues. Rather, the Speedy Trial Act was designed mainly to "assist
in reducing crime and the danger of recidivism by requiring
speedy trials and strengthening of supervision over persons re-
leased pending trial."'09 Recognizing the problem of pretrial re-
cidivism, the Speedy Trial Act was designed as an alternative so-
lution to incarceration prior to trial, rather than a device
guaranteeing the constitutional rights of defendants incarcerated
prior to trial. Thus, the Speedy Trial Act was not intended to ad-
dress the unique constitutional issues presented by the 1984 Bail
Reform Act.110 Several courts have recognized that the Speedy
Trial Act may allow a detention to become so long as to be a
violation of substantive due process."'
The dissenting opinion in United States v. Accetturo' 2 recog-
nized the problem of lengthy delay under the Speedy Trial Act,
stating:
104. 467 U.S. 253 (1984).
105. Id. at 270.
106. Id.
107. Pub. L. No. 93-619 (1974), 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (as amended 1979).
108. Salerno, 107 S. Ct. at 2101.
109. H.R. REP. 1503, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1974 U.S CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWs 7401, 7402.
110. The Speedy Trial Act was designed to interact with the then applicable law, the
1966 Bail Reform Act. The 1966 Bail Reform Act did not contemplate the pretrial deten-
tion provisions of the 1984 Bail Reform Act, but left them to a later legislation. See supra
note 42 and accompanying text.
111. See United States v. Accetturo, 783 F.2d 382, 396 (3d Cir. 1986); United
States v. Columbo, 777 F.2d 96, 101 (2d Cir. 1985).
112. Accetturo, 783 F.2d 382 (3d Cir. 1986).
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Its requirement of trial within [ninety] days for persons who
have been detained ... has turned out to be illusory, in large
part because the provision covering detainees also incorporates
the periods of excludable time enumerated in section 3161(h) in
computing the [ninety] day time limitation. As a result, deten-
tion can continue while all [eighteen] different circumstances
enumerated in 3161(h) give rise to excludable delay.11 3
These eighteen different circumstances literally make pretrial
detention an unlimited proposition. Included in such periods of ex-
cludable delay are: time for examination of the defendant's
mental and physical capacity, delay due to the absence or unavail-
ability of an essential witness, and time for complications of the
pretrial process, such as joinder of defendants and continuances. 1 4
113. Id. at 394 (Sloviter, J. dissenting).
114. Section 3161(h) of The Speedy Trial Act of 1974, provides the following:
(h) The following periods of delay shall be excluded in computing the time within
which an information or an indictment must be filed, or in computing the time
within which the trial of any such offense must commence:
(1) Any period of delay resulting from other proceedings concerning the defend-
ant, including but not limited to-
(A) delay resulting from any proceeding, including any examinations, to deter-
mine the mental competency or physical capacity of the defendant;
(B) delay resulting from any proceeding, including any examination of the de-
fendant, pursuant to section 2902 or title 28, United States Code [28 U.S.C.S.
2902];
(C) delay resulting from deferral of prosecution pursuant to section 2902 of title
28, United States Code [28 U.S.C.S. § 2902];
(D) delay resulting from trial with respect to other charges against the
defendant;
(E) delay resulting from any interlocutory appeal;
(F) delay resulting from pretrial motion, from the filing of the motion through
the conclusion of the hearing on, or other prompt disposition of such motion;
(G) delay resulting from any proceeding relating to the transfer of a case or the
removal of any defendant from another district under the Federal Rules of Crimi-
nal Procedure [U.S.C.S. Rules of Criminal Procedure];
(H) delay resulting from transportation of any defendant from another district,
or to and from places of examination or hospitalization, except that any time con-
sumed in excess of ten days from the date an order of removal or an order di-
recting such transportation, and the defendant's arrival at the destination shall be
presumed to be unreasonable;
(I) delay resulting from consideration by the court of a proposed plea agreement
to be entered into by the defendant and the attorney for the Government; and
(J) delay reasonably attributable to any period, not to exceed thirty days, dur-
ing which any proceeding concerning the defendant is actually under advisement
by the court.
(2) Any period of delay during which prosecution is deferred by the attorney for
the Government pursuant to written agreement with the defendant, with the ap-
proval of the court, for the purpose of allowing the defendant to demonstrate his
good conduct.
(3) (A) Any period of delay resulting from the absence or unavailability of the
defendant or an essential witness.
(B) For purposes of subparagraph (A) of this paragraph, a defendant or an
essential witness shall be considered absent when his whereabouts are unknown
and, in addition, he is attempting to avoid apprehension or prosecution or his
18
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These factors are often completely out of the defendant's hands,
resulting in the government's ability to manipulate the length of
pretrial detention at will.
The Court in United States v. Columbo"5 reiterated this pro-
position, stating in part that:
[E]xperience under the combined operation of these two statutes
[Bail Reform Act of 1984 and the Speedy Trial Act] may
demonstrate that the realities of complex cases having numerous
defendants and multi-count indictments are such that this con-
gressional expectation and policy may sometimes be frustrated.
.. . Exclusions authorized by section 3161(h) for pretrial mo-
tions by both sides, scheduling difficulties as well as unforesee-
able delays granted in the interest of justice, may combine to so
delay a trial that the Speedy Trial Act might not work perfectly
well to protect against lengthy incarceration. In such a case, the
length of a defendant's pretrial detention might not survive a
proper due process challenge.' 16
whereabouts cannot be determined by due diligence. For purposes of such subpar-
agraph, a defendant or an essential witness shall be considered unavailable when-
ever his whereabouts are known but his presence for trial cannot be obtained by
due diligence or he resists appearing and/or being returned for trial.
(4) Any period of delay resulting from the fact that the defendant is mentally
incompetent or physically unable to stand trial.
(5) Any period of delay resulting from the treatment of the defendant pursuant to
section 2902 of title 28, United States Code.
(6) If the information or indictment is dismissed upon motion of the attorney for
the Government and thereafter a charge is filed against the defendant for the
same offense, or any offense required to be joined with that offense, any period of
delay from the date the charge was dismissed to the date the time limitation
would commence to run as to the subsequent charge had there been no previous
charge.
(7) A reasonable period of delay when the defendant is joined for trial with a
codefendant as to whom the time for trial has not run and no motion for severance
has been granted.
(8) (A) Any period of delay resulting from a continuance granted by any judge on
his own motion or at the request of the defendant or his counsel or at the request
of the attorney for the Government, if the judge granted such continuance on the
basis of his findings that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh
the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial. No such period
of delay resulting from a continuance granted by the court in accordance with this
paragraph shall be excludable under this subsection unless the court sets forth, in
the record of the case, either orally or in writing, its reasons for finding that the
ends of justice served by the granting of such continuance outweigh the best inter-
ests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
18 U.S.C. § 3161(h) (Supp. 1987).
115. 777 F.2d 96 (2d Cir. 1985).
116. Id. at 101.
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V. DUE PROCESS AND THE COERCIVE IMPACT OF THE 1984
BAIL REFORM ACT
The government's ability to manipulate the length of pretrial
detention raises the concern of prosecutorial abuse of the Bail Re-
form Act in obtaining testimony. Granted the power to hold a de-
fendant indefinitely through the loophole created by the excluda-
ble delay provisions enumerated in section 3161(h), the
government is clearly in a coercive position when dealing with the
defendant. A valid concern is whether the 1984 Act will become a
bargaining chip, much like the plea bargain, in obtaining
testimony.
This coercive impact in obtaining testimony is brought clearly
to light by the facts underlying the Salerno case. The two defend-
ants in Salerno were Anthony "Fat Tony" Salerno, the reputed
"boss" of the Genovese crime family of La Cosa Nostra, and Vin-
cent "Fish" Cafaro, a reputed "captain" in the same organization.
These defendants were arrested on March 21, 1986, pursuant to a
twenty-nine-count indictment alleging various Racketeer Influ-
enced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) violations, mail
and wire fraud offenses, extortion, and various criminal gambling
violations.1 17 The RICO counts alleged thirty-five acts of racke-
teering including fraud, extortion, gambling, and conspiracy to
commit murder.118 The evidence against the defendants included
court-ordered wiretaps demonstrating that Salerno and Cafaro
had participated in wide-ranging conspiracies to aid their illegiti-
mate enterprises through violent means,119 and two witnesses who
would testify that Salerno had personally participated in two mur-
der conspiracies. 120 On paper, the evidence was overwhelming,
and a perfect test case for the 1984 Bail Reform Act.
At the time the Salerno case was decided by the Supreme
Court, however, the case was arguably moot. Anthony Salerno
had already been sentenced to 100 years imprisonment for charges
unrelated to these before the Supreme Court.Y' Vincent Cafaro,
117. Salerno, 107 S. Ct. at 2099.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Upon Salerno's conviction of these unrelated charges, the pretrial detention or-
der in issue before the Supreme Court became unnecessary. The District Judge ordered
Salerno released on bail pending appeal for the conviction, while he was still being held
under the pretrial detention order in question before the Supreme Court. This led Justice
Marshall to comment:
Had this judgement and commitment order been executed immediately, as is the
ordinary course, the present case would certainly have been moot with respect to
Salerno. On January 16, 1987, however, the District Judge who had sentenced
Salerno in the unrelated proceedings issued the following order, apparently with
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who was held as a danger to the community pursuant to the Bail
Reform Act's provisions, had begun working covertly with the
government as a cooperating witness, and was immediately re-
leased on a $1,000,000 personal recognizance bond.'22 The Solici-
tor General's brief to the district court, however, stated, "[o]n Oc-
tober 8, 1986, Cafaro was temporarily released for medical
treatment. Because he is still subject to the pretrial detention or-
der, Cafaro's case also continues to present a live controversy."' 23
The Solicitor General failed to inform the Supreme Court of
Cafaro's execution of a release bond, or of his covert capacity.124
Thus, the danger to the community which Vincent "Fish"
Cafaro was proven to represent by "clear and convincing" evi-
dence, suddenly disappeared at the same time he decided to work
for the prosecution as a covert witness. Further, the prosecution in
effect covered up the coerced testimony by characterizing the re-
lease as "medical" in nature. Justice Marshall, Commenting on
the situation, stated, "[a]s to Cafaro, this case was no longer justi-
ciable even before certiorari was granted, but the information
bearing on the essential issue was not made available to us. 1 25
the Government's consent:
"Inasmuch as defendant Anthony Salerno was not ordered detained in this case,
but is presently being detained pretrial in the case of United States v. Anthony
Salerno et. al, SS 86 Cr. 245 (MJL),
"IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the bail status of defendant Anthony Sa-
lerno in the above-captioned case shall remain the same as it was prior to the
January 13, 1987 sentencing, pending further order of the Court." Order in SS 85
Cr. 139 (RO)(S.D.N.Y.)(Owen, J.).
This order is curious. To release on bail pending appeal "a person who has been
found guilty of an offense and sentenced to a term of imprisonment," the District
Judge was required to find "by clear and convincing evidence that the person is
not likely to flee or pose a danger to the safety of any other person or the commu-
nity if released .. . ." 18 U.S.C. § 3143(b)(1)(1982 ed., Supp. III). In short, the
District Court that had sentenced Salerno to 100 years imprisonment then found,
with the Government's consent, that he was not dangerous, in a vain attempt to
keep alive the controversy as to Salerno's dangerousness before this court.
Id. at 2106 n.l. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
122. Id. at 2106 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall stated in his dissenting
opinion:
In early October 1986, before the Solicitor General's petition for certiorari was
granted, respondent Cafaro became a cooperating witness, assisting the govern-
ment's investigation 'by working in a covert capacity.' The fact that Cafaro was
cooperating with the government was not revealed to his co-defendants, including
Salerno. On October 9, 1986, respondent Cafaro was released, ostensibly 'tempo-
rarily for medical care and treatment' with the Government's consent.
Id.
123. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting). "This information was all that was released to the
court. Further particulars of the Government's agreement with Cafaro, including the pre-
cise terms of the agreement to release him on bail, are not included in the record, and the
Court has declined to order that the relevant documents be placed before us." Id.
124. Id. at 2107 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
125. Id.
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Justice Marshall characterized this situation as "disturbing. 1' 26
CONCLUSION
The ability of the government to abuse its discretion in using
the Bail Reform Act of 1984's pretrial detention provisions to ma-
nipulate the judicial process is illuminated by the disturbing man-
ner in which the Solicitor General withheld key evidence of Vin-
cent Cafaro's decision to become a covert government witness, and
his subsequent release from custody. It seems that his pretrial de-
tention was not based on the legitimate government interest in
community safety, but rather to force him to testify or remain
imprisoned indefinitely.1 27 Because this information was not made
available to the Supreme Court justices, or Salerno's own attor-
neys, the issue of the use of the Bail Reform Act of 1984 to coerce
testimony from witnesses was never addressed in the Salerno
decision.1 28
Clearly, such coercion strikes at the defendant's, as well as the
witnesses', due process rights. Witness coercion also opens the is-
sue of the reliability of testimony received by the government.
Someone who can be held under the 1984 Act is likely to be a
hardened criminal, with little concern for the morality behind
sworn testimony. Given the choice between perjury and indefinite
detention, such a person could easily be coerced into testifying,
with or without the government's actual knowledge of the facts to
which he is testifying.
This Comment suggests that Congress should modify the Bail
Reform Act of 1984 to reflect a more realistic view of how the
1984 Act interacts with the Speedy Trial Act, and its potential for
prosecutorial abuse. This legislation should create a less arbitrary
standard governing the maximum excludable time delay for those
detained on motion by the prosecution. To accomplish this goal, a
provision should be added to the Bail Reform Act which creates a
rebuttable presumption of bailability for those detained on govern-
ment motion after the passage of a fixed time limit. At the same
time, motions by the defense for additional time to prepare a de-
fense could be granted under excludable time delay. This would
allow defense attorneys flexibility in the amount of time allotted
to prepare a defense, while encouraging their efforts for a speedy
trial due to the defendant's incarceration during the delays. Such
126. Id. at 2106 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
127. The author reaches this conclusion based on the coincidence of the time be-
tween Cafaro's cooperation with the government and release, and the suspicious circum-
stances which were not revealed in the Solicitor General's brief to the Court.
128. See supra notes 122-23.
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a modification would retain all the legitimate benefits to commu-
nity safety for which the Act was intended, while minimizing the
coercive power the prosecution now holds in obtaining testimony.
This suggestion of a fixed time limit is neither novel nor new,
but has never been proposed in light of the issue of witness coer-
cion. Courts dealing solely with the length of pretrial delay had
earlier made the call for such a statutorily defined limit to the
maximum length of pretrial detention.129 Justice Sloviter, in his
dissent in United States v. Accetturo, eloquently supported this
proposition, stating:
I suggest that it is incumbent upon us to use our supervisory
power to fix a timetable beyond which no person can be held in
pretrial detention on the ground of dangerousness without being
accorded a full due process hearing. The timetable should not be
extended for reasons attributable to any other factor other than
that detainee's own waiver. Failure to comply would not result
in dismissal of the charges, but merely in the defendant's release
pending trial under appropriate conditions. The suggestion is
hardly radical since it was the procedure in use for 200 years. I
agree with Judge Weinstein that "a long period of preventive
detention without a finding of guilt, based solely on possible dan-
ger to the public, is 'anathema to American ideals of due pro-
cess.' " [citations omitted]
I respectfully dissent from the judgment of the majority be-
cause it has failed to accept the challenge, seize the opportunity,
and take the bold step needed to insure effectuation of the de-
fendants' due process rights.13
Tim J. Vanden Heuvel*
129. See United States v. Columbo, 777 F.2d 96 (2d Cir. 1985); United States v.
Accetturo, 783 F.2d 382 (3d Cir. 1986).
130. Accetturo, 783 F.2d at 382, 396 (Sloviter, J., dissenting) (quoting U.S. v.
Columbo, 616 F. Supp. 780, 785 (S.D.N.Y 1985), (quoting R.B. MCNAMARA, CONSTITU-
TIONAL LIITS ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 135 (1982) rev'd 777 F.2d 96 (2d Cir. 1985))).
* Thanks to the devil's advocates, who kept law school humorous and the tedious
process of writing this Comment bearable.
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